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show the kinship and which are found in the chain of title-for
example, succession proceedings? Such situations are apt to be more
frequent. The footnote partially quoted may raise some conjecture
as to whether or not such record entries place third parties on notice
of the potential claims of heirs.
LEASE
Alvin B. Rubin*
Lessor's Privilege and Right of Pledge
In the case of Burgin v. Jumonville Pipe & Machinery Com-
pany, Incorporated,1 the plaintiff was a sublessor of a tract to the
defendant. The oral lease under which plaintiff held had expired
on December 30, 1944, but he had remained in possession under
assurances that his lease would be renewed. The lease was in fact
renewed in writing for the calendar year 1945, on March 23, 1945.
Meanwhile defendant had been informed that his sublease would
terminate at the end of 1945, but defendant also remained in posses-
sion. On March 27, 1945, plaintiff seized the defendant's effects on
the land in question asserting a lessor's privilege and right of pledge.
The defendant contended that ihe plaintiff had no privilege
because the property in question was not "leased" by the plaintiff
from plaintiff's lessor, nor, in turn, by the plaintiff to defendant at
any time after January 1, 1945, and the fifteen day period prescribed
for exercise of the lessor's privilege after the property is removed
from the leased premises had elapsed.'
The court mentioned Civil Code Article 2688 dealing with tacit
reconduction of a lease. But "regardless of whether plaintiff's lease
was reconducted, ... a written lease was executed by the land-
owner in favor of Burgin [the plaintiff] for the calendar year 1945,
and therefore, . . .Burgin had the full right to possession of the
premises .. .for the entire year 1945, including the months of
January, February, and March, and defendant, insofar as the year
1945 is concerned, is without any right whatsoever to contest the
occupancy or possession of the premises by Burgin, this being a
matter solely and entirely between the landowner.., and Burgin."'
*Part-time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 211 La. 148, 29 So. (2d) 595 (1947).
2. Art. 2709, La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. 211 La. 148, 157, 29 So. (2d) 595, 598.
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Therefore the plaintiff's right to a privilege was recognized.
Damage to Leased Premises
Civil Code Article 2697 provides that if the thing leased be
totally destroyed by an unforeseen event, the lease is at an end. "If
it be only destroyed in part, the lessee may either demand a diminu-
tion of the price, or a revocation of the lease." In Treigle Sash
Factory v. Saladino4 the court held that where property is only
partially destroyed, only the lessee may terminate the lease (or ask
reduction of the price), and, if he does not wish to exercise his
option to do so, the lessor may not insist upon termination.' So
long as many current leases executed at relatively low rentals remain
in force, this will block an avenue which might otherwise be open
to lessors who wish an opportunity to escape from existing leases in
order to take advantage of present high rental rates.
In the Treigle case, the property leased was damaged by a fire
which occurred during a lease which had about two months to run.
However a new lease for an additional three year period had already
been executed. The lessee lost his life in the fire, and the lessor
demanded acceleration of the rental for the entire three year period
under a clause in the new lease providing for such acceleration, at
lessor's option, if the lessee died. The court stated that, since the
new lease had not yet gone into operation when the suit was filed,
this was in effect a request for a declaratory judgment. This the
court refused to grant.
Interpretation
Plaintiff, a landowner, and defendant, a grocery store operator,
conducted negotiations for a lease. A proposed lease was prepared,
calling for a rental based on a percentage of defendant's sales, with
a minimum monthly rental of $350. Thereafter the parties agreed
that defcndant would also lease a service station located on a portion
of the same premises. A new lease was drawn stating that the
monthly rental was to be a percentage of defendant's sales, subject
to a minimum of $585 monthly. The percentage, however, was to
4. :31 So. (2d) 172 (La. 1947).
5. The court intimated that, in considering the question of whether the prop-
erty is wholly or only partially destroYed, the question of whether repairs
could or could not be made without disturbing the lessee's occupancy, is not
important in application of the first sentence of Article 2697, that distinction
is relevant primarily in determining whether the lessee is entitled to have his
lease terminated or not, in the exercise of his option under the second sentence
of Article 2697.
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be computed on gross sales excluding the sales of petroleum products
and other products sold from the service station.
In Weber v. H. G. Hill Stores, Incorporated,6 the plaintiff con-
tended that under this lease he should be paid a minimum of $585
monthly, but that the $235 additional minimum paid for the service
station should be excluded in determining the excess rental to which
he was entitled under the percentage clause. On exception of no
cause of action, the court stated that the lease was "clear and unam-
biguous, and we do not think it is susceptible of the construction
and interpretation placed thereon by plaintiff."7 However, the plain-
tiff had alleged in the alternative that, if this was not the proper
interpretation of the lease, there was mutual error in preparing it
and had asked for reformation of the document. The court found
a cause of action stated in this regard and remanded the case for
trial of the issue of mutual error.
General
As the court noted, the issues presented in Pittman Contracting
Company, Incorporated v. City Home Builders, Incorporated8 boiled
down to a question of fact: was a crane leased by the plaintiff to the
defendant in good working order when delivered? The court
sustained a finding by the trial court that the plaintiff's evidence
"clearly preponderated over that of the defendant" and awarded
the rental prayed for. The evidence supporting certain items of
damages claimed by plaintiff was found to be "too vague and un-
certain to sustain a judgment in plaintiff's favor," and the trial court
was affirmed in this regard as well.
6. 210 La. 977, 29 So. (2d) 83 (1946).
7. 210 La. 977, 990, 29 So. (2d) 38, 87 (1946).
8. 211 La. 549, 30 So. (2d) 426 (1947).
